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Abstract
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about
member states’ potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In
our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states (lenders). In
the presence of asymmetric information, bail-out and national governments’ shortsightedness make the
first-best fiscal rule non-implementable as member states are tempted to run excessively high deficits.
The Monetary Union designs a mechanism such that member states with high output gap (i.e., in a
recession) run higher budget deficits by making an ex-post transfer to the Union. We find that the
first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle – i.e., on the member state’s output gap – and, all else equal,
can be implemented provided the member states’ ability to repay its own debt upon the realization of
a bad shock is suﬃciently high. A downward distortion in the deficit run by a member state during
an expansion is otherwise introduced. Finally, the Monetary Union cannot discriminate among types of
borrowers when national governments are excessively shortsighted.
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1 Introduction
The debate about fiscal rules within a Monetary Union – and, especially, within the European Monetary
Union – has recently attracted much attention from scholars and policymakers alike. Fiscal rules within
the European Monetary Union have been anchored to the ‘3%-rule’ since the Maastricht Treaty. According
to this much controversial rule, member states must converge over time towards a deficit/GDP ratio not
higher than 3%. Within this framework, one of the main rationale for imposing a cap on member states’
deficit is represented by the possibility – perceived by the financial market – that less ‘virtuous’ member
states might benefit from more ‘virtuous’ members’ financial help (bail-out) and, therefore, fail to internalize
the externality they impose on the Union. Since 2013, the ‘Fiscal Compact’ has modified the set of fiscal
constraints in the European Monetary Union and created a new set of rules based on ‘cyclically-adjusted’
deficit targets. However, the eﬀectiveness of targeting a policy variable whose value is adjusted for business
cycle fluctuations relies on the observation of each country’s potential output level, which is - at best - very
hard to identify and gives rise to many controversies between the European Commission and member states’
governments.
In this paper we treat the issue of designing fiscal rules as a standard asymmetric information problem
and we propose a mechanism able to deliver the optimal nominal deficit choice by member states. Our
main assumptions - for which we provide ample justifications - are that (i) national governments know their
potential output better than the Monetary Union decision-making body does, and (ii) the marginal benefit
of deficit spending is increasing with the magnitude of the (negative) output gap. We build a model in which
(potential) bail-out among member states, on the one hand, makes them less eager to signal their type to
the financial market while, on the other hand, it makes them more eager to ineﬃciently over-borrow on
the financial market. Provided national governments are suﬃciently longsighted, the Monetary Union can
re-establish (possibly constrained) eﬃciency by designing a mechanism in which a higher cap on deficit is
allowed to members experiencing a recession – with respect to the lower cap imposed on those experiencing
an expansion – upon payment of a lump-sum transfer to the Union.
Scholars have largely debated on the need for public finance constraints in a Monetary Union with decen-
tralized fiscal policies. Dixit and Lambertini [2001] and Dixit [2001] among others, argue that the need for
constraints to fiscal policies arise as an unconstrained fiscal behaviour can aﬀect and undermine monetary
committment.1 Externalities among member states within a Monetary Union are channeled by at least three
related mechanisms: (i) the upward pressure on the common interest rate that would result from an unlim-
ited deterioration of national fiscal aggregates, (ii) the risk of bail-out of the undisciplined member state,
1For analyses on optimal country-specific fiscal stabilization policies, see Galì and Monacelli [2005] and Ferrero [2009].
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and (iii) the risk of financial contagion through a capital market which is further integrated by the absence
of exchange rate risk in trading diﬀerent member states’ financial assets. Fiscal rules are then designed to
prevent such externalities. The debate on their exact specification has always been lively. Literature debates
between deficit-based rules (Artis and Buti [2000], Brunila [2002], Buti et al. [2002], and Wyplosz [2002])
and expenditure-based rules (Bruck and Zwiener [2006]) according to the best stabilization properties. At
the same time, the possibility that fiscal rules could be sub-optimal has emerged. If the central bank is
suﬃciently committed to its future policy (Chari and Kehoe [1998]), if shocks are idiosyncratic (Cooper
and Kempf [2000]), or in the presence of intra-EU competitiveness diﬀerentials (Engwerda [2002]), then a
fiscally-constrained monetary union can be welfare-reducing and lead to suboptimal stabilization of output
and prices at the national level.
This paper assumes away the potential benefits deriving from a Monetary Union, and focuses on the
potential sub-optimality that can arise from cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules because of the interaction between
(i) asymmetric information over the member states’ true potential output level and (ii) intra-Union potential
bail-out. Bottazzi and Manasse [2005] acknowledge the existence of an important information asymmetry
between member states in a Monetary Union regarding domestic macroeconomic conditions. Bordignon et al.
[2001] also assume the presence of such an asymmetry between government layers and analyze the optimal
income redistribution in a federal state where the true regional tax bases are private information. In line with
these contributions, in our model the information asymmetry between the Monetary Union decision-making
body and member states’ governments concerns the underlying member states’ potential output level. For
instance, each member state’s potential output is a function of the national government’s past (structural)
investments, where the eﬃciency of past investments – e.g., the fraction of investments that is not spent in
socially wasteful private perks – is the national government’s private information.
We show that the problem of asymmetric information is exacerbated by the presence of potentail bail-
out among member states, because bail-out lessens the standard cross-subsidization between diﬀerent types
(i.e., low versus high potential output) of each single borrower, while at the same time fosters ineﬃcient
over-borrowing on the financial market, and especially so by the type that needs it the least. Given the inter-
action between bail-out and asymmetric information, the Monetary Union can restor (possibly constrained-)
eﬃciency by designing a mechanism requiring member states experiencing a recession and – therefore – more
in need of larger budget deficits, to borrow on the financial market by committing to transfer ex-post a
lump-sum to the Union. Discriminating between a member state’s types requires that diﬀerent types diﬀer
both when good and bad shocks hit their economy though. Hence, a downward distortion in the level of
borrowing by member states experiencing an expansion must be introduced when, all else equal, the ability to
3
repay the debt is relatively low upon the realization of a bad shock. Finally, excessively shortsighted national
governments hinders the mechanism designed by the Monetary Union as they become less concerned with
ex-post payments.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the current set of fiscal rules in the
European Monetary Union and discusses costs and benefits of targeting cyclically-adjusted variables. Section
3 lays out the model. We first solve the model under complete information and show how bail-out fosters
over-borrowing in the absence of fiscal rules at the Union level. We then solve the model under incomplete
information, show the interaction between bail-out and asymmetric information, and describe the design of
the optimal mechanism at Union level. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Policy Background: the EMU Fiscal Framework
The current European Monetary Union (EMU) fiscal framework is defined by the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP), by the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG) – better known as ‘Fiscal
Compact’ - and by secondary legislation which defines the implementation process.2 This framework im-
poses a number of constraints on member states’ fiscal policy aggregates: budget deficit (both nominal and
cyclically-adjusted), public debt and government spending. The main purpose is to ensure that national fiscal
policies are conducted so as to lead to healthy public finances over the short and longer terms, in order to
prevent the rising of negative spillover eﬀects which might arise in a currency union where national fiscal po-
sitions are unbalanced. Specifically the framework includes two nominal constraints and a cyclically-adjusted
one. First, nominal budget deficit must be less than 3% of the GDP every year. Second, debt-to-GDP ratio
must converge to 60% with given yearly steps.3 Finally, cyclically-adjusted budget deficit must converge
to the country-specific Medium-Term Objective (MTO) with given yearly steps.4 5 Deviations from those
targets are tolerated if a member state experiences severe downturns, catastrophic events, or has been im-
plementing major structural reforms able to yield long-term positive budgetary eﬀects and raise potential
2SGP has been formulated in 1997 (art.121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and has been implemented
for the first time in 1999. It has been subsequently modified in 2005 and 2011. TSCG has been signed in March 2012 by all
EU Member States except Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Concerning the secondary legislation, see Regulation
1175/2011 and Regulation 1177/2011.
3The step - calculated over a three year period (either backward or forward, according to the most favorable one) - is the 5%
of the diﬀerence between the actual debt-to-GDP ratio and the 60% level.
4The step has been initially set at 0.5% of GDP. However the EU Commission has later decided to make it contingent on
the state of the cycle (European Commission [2015]).
5A further nominal target is imposed: the rate of growth of public spending that is not matched by corresponding revenue
increases – excluding interest payments and cyclical automatic changes in unemployment benefits – must not exceed the rate
of growth of potential output. In order not to penalize investments, that component is averaged over four years. This last
prescription is a further deficit-reducing measure. It has been designed to strengthen the control on government spending and
avoid prociclicality.
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growth (European Commission [2015]).
At the beginning of each year t, member states must submit Stability Programmes (SP) reporting the
budgetary framework from year t 1 up to year t+3, so that the compliance with the whole above-described
set of constraints can be assessed by EU authorities. Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts are made at the
national level – either by the government or by independent bodies – but must be compared with the most
recent forecasts performed by the EU Commission, which ultimately prevail in case of divergences. The EU
Commission provides an ex-post assessment for year t  1, an in-year assessment for the year t on the basis
of in-year estimates, and an ex-ante evaluation for the year t+1.6 Commission’s evaluations are handed over
to member states before the end of time t. If a member state’s in-year or ex-ante evaluations are not in line
with the rules along any of the above dimensions of constraints – and if they do not fall into the exceptional
circumstances previously described – the Commission invites the member state to revise its budget-policies.
If, instead, at time t a member state fails the ex-post assessment on the t  1 fiscal policy framework, a fine
is possibly imposed until the violation is corrected.
The MTO, introduced in the 2011 reform of fiscal governance, is defined as a structural budget deficit,
namely in cyclically-adjusted terms, net of one-oﬀ and other temporary measures7, and it is defined as follows:
Dt
CA
= Dt + "
DY
⇣
Yt   Y ⇤t
⌘
, (1)
where Dt denotes nominal budget deficit, Yt denotes nominal output, Y ⇤t represents potential output, and
"
DY
is the semi-elasticity of the budget deficit (as a ratio to aggregate output) to the business cycle. The
semi-elasticity "
DY
measures the automatic non-discretionary change in nominal deficit-to-GDP ratio in
response to output gap movements. It is computed as the weighted diﬀerence between the elasticities of,
respectively, revenue-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP to output, where the weights are given by the ten-
years moving averages of output shares of revenue and expenditure. From (1), D
CA
t – the target of MTO
– crucially depends on "
DY
and Y
⇤
t . While the former is estimated with standard techniques from oﬃcial
data, the estimation of the latter is aﬀected by some problems. The EU Council of July 2002 establishes
that the reference method for the estimation of member states’ potential output is the ‘production function
approach’. This method computes potential output on the basis of a standard technology-augmented Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale on potential capital K and labour L (Denis et
al. [2002], Roeger [2006]). Technology is estimated through a bivariate Kalman Filter that exploits the link
between its cyclical component and the degree of capacity utilization measured using the Capacity Utilization
6A qualitative assesment is made for the years t+ 2 and t+ 3.
7Examples of such measures are sales of non-financial assets, receipts of auctions of public owned licenses, tax amnesties,
etc..
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Indicator (only available for the manufacturing sector) and the Business Survey Capacity Indicator (collected
for the manufacturing sector, the construction sector, and services as part of the EU Commission’s Business
and Consumer Survey Programme). Potential capital stock, measured by the perpetual inventory method,
corresponds to its actual value, under the assumption of full utilization of the existing stock. The capital
is extrapolated in the out-of-sample period according to a given profile of productive investment (estimated
through an AR(2) process) and assuming a constant depreciation rate (Cacciotti et al. [2014]). As for
potential labour, it is calculated by a Kalman filter estimation of country-specific NAWRU, where the trend
component is a random walk with drift, and the cyclical component is given by a Phillips Curve which relates
the change in wage inflation to the unemployment rate and other exogenous variables such as terms of trade
and wage share.
Although such a procedure is in line with the literature on the topic, it reveals that pinning down the true
full-resources-utilization output level and, therefore, the output gap, is at least doubtful. More importantly,
the estimation procedure requires calibration of several parameters whose choice is discretionary and to whom
final results are extremely sensitive. It is important to stress that such a choice – in terms of priors and
forecasts – is ultimately up to the EU Commission. The structural budget deficit – computed as in (1) –
must converge to the country-specific MTO, which is the lowest – i.e., the most ambitious – between three
alternative thresholds whose computation is updated every three years. More specifically:
MTO = max
n
D
CA
ILD
, D
CA
MB
, 1%
o
. (2)
In (2), D
CA
ILD
denotes the value of the structural deficit that ensures the convergence of debt-to-GDP ratio
towards a ‘sustainable’ level once explicit and implicit liabilities (such as ageing costs) are taken into account.8
D
CA
MB
denotes the threshold value that ensures the respect of the 3% nominal reference under normal cyclical
conditions, and is computed by adjusting the 3% deficit-to-GDP ratio for the eﬀect of a ‘EU-representative’
cyclical fluctuations. Finally, the last term in (2) is the framework’s upper-bound member states agreed
upon.
By 2015, the EU fiscal framework also links the convergence speed towards the MTO to cyclical conditions
– given by the magnitude and sign of the output gap – and debt-to-GDP ratio (EU Commission [2015]). This
novelty further strengthens the countercyclical nature of fiscal rules.
To sum up, cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules present both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, they
exploit countries’ true fiscal stance, irrespective of business cycle fluctuations. Hence, they induce counter-
8More specifically, D
CA
ILD
is the sum of three components: (a) the value that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio at 60% under
the forecasted average nominal growth for 2010-2060, (b) the value that covers one third of the present value of the projected
increase in age-related expenditure, and (c) a supplementary debt-reduction eﬀort were the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio to be
above 60%.
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cyclical national fiscal policies, whose desirability has been widely discussed in the literature (Siu [2004], Galì
and Monacelli [2005], Manasse [2007], and Ferrero [2009]). They aim at generating a structurally balanced
budget for member states, while providing them with a safety margin (up to the 3% limit) to expand the
budget in response to negative output fluctuations, and viceversa (see Andres and Domenech [2006]). On
the other hand, cyclically-adjusted rules require rigorous calculation and estimation of latent variables that
are unobservable both ex-ante and ex-post. Marcellino and Musso [2011] and Tereanu et al. [2014] document
the mistakes in fiscal policy prescriptions due to the unreliability of potential output estimation. Cottarelli
[2015] notes that, because the capital stock is derived as the sum of past investments that, in turn, are
the most cyclical component of aggregate demand, it might reflect past demand conditions rather than the
structural supply features of an economy. As described in the previous section, in this paper we take the view
that potential output is determined by the ‘eﬀectiveness’ of past structural investments made by national
governments. This, we argue, gives an informational advantage to a member state’s government with respect
to the EMU ’s decision-making body over the estimate of the member states’ potential output.
3 The Model
Our economy is populated by two countries Si, for i = 1, 2. The two countries belong to a monetary union
(MU) that acts through an independent decision-making body. Each country finances public expenditures by
recurring to both taxes and competitive financial outside investors. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize
taxes to zero.9 Hence, in our simplified framework, public expenditures correspond to (primary) deficit
Di 2 [0,+1), for i = 1, 2. Although Di can in principle take negative values – in which case it represents a
surplus – the normalization of taxes to zero allows us to focus on positive values only.
Di delivers a high return Y (Di) 2 [Y ,+1) with probability p (✓i), and a low return Y with probability
1   p (✓i), where Y (Di) is increasing and concave, with Y (0) = Y   0, and where ✓i 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
, with ✓¯ > ✓,
for i = 1, 2.10 For instance, Y can be interpreted as the salvage value of assets in case of bankruptcy net of
any pre-existing debt. The parameter ✓i represents Si’s ouput gap, i.e., the diﬀerence between Si’s current
real output Yi,0, and its potential output Y Pi , for i = 1, 2.11 The current real output Yi,0 is exogenously given
and observable by all the players. Potential output is unobservable to MU and, therefore, so is the output
gap. MU attaches probability ↵i to ✓i = ✓¯, and 1   ↵i to ✓i = ✓, for i = 1, 2. For the sake of simplicity,
9Our normalization implies that MU ’s member states invest all the collected taxes. This assumption deserves some qualifi-
cation. In the presence of asymmetric information between MU and Si, for i = 1, 2, taxes can be modeled as cash-in-hand and,
therefore, may function as a signalling device. However, diﬀerently from models of corporate financing, Si’s government may
fail to fully internalize taxes expenditure. In this case, taxes function poorly as a signalling device.
10Because we consider Di 2 [0,+1), for i = 1, 2, we also consider Y   0.
11Notice that, because we analyze a 1-period (dynamic) framework (see below), we can interpret Y (D) as either output
realization or output growth rate. This is also true of the variable D, which can be intepreted as either debt or deficit.
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we assume that ✓i’s probability distribution is independent of Yi,0.12 We further assume that ✓i is perfectly
observable by Si. This assumption captures a framework in which ✓i is also unobservable to Si, but whose
prior distribution is more informative than MU ’s one.
Utility Functions. Si’s utility function is given by:
Ui (✓i,  i) = [p (✓i)Y (Di) + (1  p (✓i)) (Y + tj)]   i [p (✓i) (YL,i + ti) + (1  p (✓i))min {YL,i + ti, Y + tj}] , (3)
8✓i, where YL,i 2 [0, Y (Di)] is the return accruing to perfectly competitive lenders, and where ti   0
represents a net transfer from Si to Sj , for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.13 The parameter  i 2 (0, 1], for i = 1, 2,
denotes Si’s discounting of the cost of debt. For instance,  i < 1 captures the shortsightedness of Si’s
government.
The first term in square brackets in (3) represents the expected realization of output as a function of Si’s
type (✓i) and investment (Di), while the second term in square brackets represents the discounted expected
payment to lenders. Notice that both the expected output and the marginal benefit of Di are increasing in
✓i: the higher Si’s output gap – or, similarly, the higher Si’s potential output – the higher the multiplier of
public investments. The idea that the size of the multipliers of government spending depends on the output
gap is supported by solid contributions on both the theoretical and the empirical sides. From the theoretical
viewpoint, Christiano et al. [2009] and Woodford [2010], among others, note that the spending multiplier is
higher during recessions because the economy is most likely to reach the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate.14 In particular, the proportionality between slack capacity and output eﬀects of the government
spending stimulus comes from the fact that, because of the higher output gap, the government-spending-
induced increase in output translates into a lower rise in inflation due to the flatter marginal cost curve which
prevails under a great deal of excess capacity. This makes it easier for central banks to maintain a constant real
interest rate even in face of an aggregate demand stimulus. This intuition is empirically confirmed and fairly
robust to alternative estimation techniques. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012a] employ a regime-switching
structural VAR (SVAR) with smooth transition across states, where the threshold variable is exogenously
determined.15 The authors estimate a quarterly data model (1947-2009) for the US and find that the output
12One may think of a framework in which an extremely high (low) realization of Yi,0 determines a lower (higher) value of ↵i.
13More specifically, ti represent a transfer from Si to MU , which further redistributes it to Sj , for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. ti   0
represents a limited liability constraint preventing MU from allocating to countries more money than the amount received from
them.
14See also Manasse [2007].
15 More specifically, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012a] use a moving average representation of the GDP growth rate.
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eﬀect of government spending is considerably larger during a recession rather than during an expansion.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012b] and Batini et al. [2012] obtain similar results by looking at a larger
sample of OECD countries. Baum et al. [2012] adopt a non-linear threshold VAR and – more importantly
for our purposes – use output gap (rather than GDP growth) to define the cycle and better identify business
fluctuations (see also Harding and Pagan [2002]). They investigate six of the G7 economies from the 1970s
to 2011 and find that in all cases the magnitude of the multiplier size is increasing with the negative output
gap.
MU ’s utility function is given by:
V =
2X
i=1
↵iUi (✓, 1) + (1  ↵i)Ui
 
✓¯, 1
 
. (4)
MU ’s objective function diﬀers from Si’s one because of (i) the aggregation of U1 and U2 (each with the
same weight), and (ii) the absence of discounting of the cost of debt, i.e.,  MU = 1. The pair {t1, t2} of net
transfers among member states does not directly aﬀect MU ’s utility.
Simplifying Assumptions. In the following, we simplify our framework by assuming that ↵1 = 1. Let us
further simplify our model by assuming that p1 = 1.16 Country S1’s type is then known to all the players,
and S1 is such that it always realizes a high return Y (D1) from its investment D1.
Financial Market. The lending market is competitive. Because S1 and S2 are part of MU , lenders
anticipate that bail-out by one member state towards another one can occur, provided suﬃcient funds are
available at the MU -level.17 Given our simplifying assumptions, bail-out can possibly occur from S1 to S2.
The lenders’ break-even constraints for S1 and S2 are given by:
YL,1   D1, (5)
p (✓2)YL,2 + (1  p (✓2)) {min [YL,2, Y ] + min [Y (D1)  YL,1, YL,2   Y ]⇥ 1 {YL,2 > Y }}   D2, (6)
respectively, where the E denotes the expectaction operator, and where 1 {YL,2 > Y } is an indicator function
that takes value 1 when YL,2 > Y , and takes value 0 otherwise. Notice that the transfer t2 does not enter (6)
because we assume that debt repayment YL,2 is senior with respect to t2. Moreover, given our assumption
on S1, we anticipate that (i) t1 = 0 and (ii) S1 is able to fully repay its debt D1.
16The assumption p (✓1) = 1 does not necessarily imply that p (✓2) = 1 when ✓2 = ✓¯. This assumption is made to simplify
computations only.
17In our model, bail-out generates externalities among member states. On national governments’ shortsighedness and exter-
nalities within a monetary union, see Cukierman et al. [1992], Roubini and Sachs [1989], Alesina and Tabellini [1990], Tabellini
and Alesina [1990], Beetsma and Bovenberg [1999], and Manasse [2007].
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Timing. We analyze a one-period dynamic game. At the beginning of the period, Nature draws ✓2, and
this is perfectly revealed to S2 only. MU then post contracts. More specifically, MU sets DMU1 and designs
a mechanism
 
t (✓2) , DMU (✓2)
 
, for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. Given DMU1 and
 
t (✓2) , DMU (✓2)
 
, Si borrows Di from
competitive lenders, for i = 1, 2. Finally, output realizes, lenders gets repayment and transfers ti are made,
for i = 1, 2. Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE ).
In the following, we assume that MU can fully restrict Si’s choice of Di to the proposed mechanism: this
is equivalent to a situation in which Si incurs a suﬃciently high penalty were it to violate the terms of the
proposed mechanism.
We proceed by first investigating the solution to both Si’s andMU ’s problems under complete information
about ✓2, for i = 1, 2.
3.1 The Benchmark: Complete Information
Suppose ✓2 is perfectly observable by all the parties. We first study Si’s optimal decentralized choice of
Di given it belong s to MU , for i = 1, 2. S1 solves the following constrained maximization problem:
max
{D1}
Y (D1)   1YL,1, (7)
s.t. YL,1 = D1.
S2 solves:
max
{D2}
[p (✓2)Y (D2) + (1  p (✓2))Y ]   2 [p (✓2) (YL,2 + t2) + (1  p (✓2))min {YL,2 + t2, Y }] , (8)
s.t. p (✓2)YL,2 + (1  p (✓2)) {min [YL,2, Y ] + min [Y (D1)  YL,1, YL,2   Y ]⇥ 1 {YL,2 > Y }} = D2.
The solution to S1’s problem in (7) is given by the first-order conditions(FOC):
Y 0
⇣
Dˆ1
⌘
=  1. (9)
The solution to S2’s problem in (8) depends on D2. If D2  Y , one can check that YL,2 = D2 < Y . In this
case, S2 is able to pay its own debt independently of the realized state of nature. If D2 > Y instead, provided
min [Y (D1)  YL,1, YL,2   Y ] = YL,2   Y , from the lenders’ break-even constraint we obtain YL,2 = D2 > Y ,
that implies the following first-order condition to the problem in (8):
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Y 0
⇣
Dˆ2
⌘
=  2. (10)
Because min [Y (D1)  YL,1, YL,2   Y ] = YL,2 Y , S1 is able to provide full coverage for S2’s debt if a bad
state of nature realizes (Y (D2) = Y ).18 Therefore, the investment optimally chosen by S2 is independent of
its type ✓2.
In the following we assume that the pair
n
Dˆ1, Dˆ2
o
is such that min
h
Y
⇣
Dˆ1
⌘
  Dˆ1, Dˆ2   Y
i
= Dˆ2   Y ,
where Dˆ2 > Y and – from the lenders’ break-even constraint – YL,i = Dˆi, for i = 1, 2.
We now analyze MU ’s optimal choice of Di, for i = 1, 2. From (4), MU solves:
max
{D1,D2}
2X
i=1
p (✓i)Y (Di) + (1  p (✓i))Y  Di, (11)
where we have substituted the constraints (5) and (6) into the objective function, and where YL,i = Di, for
i = 1, 2. The FOCs to this problem are given by:
p (✓i)Y
0
⇣
D
⇤
i
⌘
= 1, for i = 1, 2. (12)
By comparing (9) and (10) with (12), it is easily seen that the solution to MU ’s problem D⇤i (✓i) is weakly
lower than Dˆi (✓i,  i), for i = 1, 2. More specifically, we have D
⇤
1  Dˆ1 ( 1) and D
⇤
2 (✓) < D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
< Dˆ2 ( 2).
To sum up, both S1 and S2 tend to ineﬃciently over-borrow because of their government’s shortsighted-
ness. Moreover, potential bail-out further induces S2 to ineﬃciently over-borrowin the financial market. MU
internalizes the potential bail-out by S1 and sets an eﬃcient investment that is increasing in S2’s ability to
generate a high return, i.e., S2’s deficit level increases with its potential output (output gap).
In order to focus on the most interesting scenario, in the following we set D
⇤
2 (✓) > Y .
3.2 Borrowing Under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the analysis of the case in which there is asymmetric information over the value of ✓2.
Let us define p
 
✓¯
  ⌘ p¯ and p (✓) ⌘ p, where  p ⌘ p¯  p > 0.
The lenders’ break-even constraint with respect to S2 is now given by:
⇥
↵p¯+ (1  ↵) p⇤YL,2+⇥↵ (1  p¯) + (1  ↵)  1  p ⇤ {min [YL,2, Y ] + min [Y (D1)  YL,1, YL,2   Y ]⇥ 1 {YL,2 > Y }}   D2.
(13)
Because of bail-out, (13) is rewritten as:
18Our main results hold also when min
⇥
Y (D1)  YL,1, YL,2   Y
⇤
= Y (D1) YL,1. We focus on the case that makes it easier
to carry computations out.
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YL,2   D2. (14)
From (14), we immediately have that, in a decentralized solution, S2 sets Dˆ2 ( 2) independently of its
type ✓2. Unlike in standard models of adverse selection, in the presence of bail-out neither lenders have
incentives in designing a mechanism to discriminate between types of borrowers, nor borrowers have an
incentive in separating themselves through signalling.19 In our framework, we show that MU is interested
in discriminating between diﬀerent types of borrowers because of the ineﬃcient over-borrowing arising under
asymmetric information.
Consider then the case in which MU is able to restrict (e.g., put a cap to) S1 and S2’s borrowing choices.
MU sets D
⇤
1 for S1. Also, supposeMU proposes S2 the pair
n
D
⇤
, D¯
⇤o
, where D
⇤
(✓) ⌘ D⇤ and D⇤  ✓¯  ⌘ D¯⇤ .
Because of bail-out, we have that YL,2 (D2) = D2 independently of S2’s choice between D
⇤
and D¯
⇤
.
Let us define ✓˜2 as S2’s report of its type ✓2. S2’s utility when ✓2 = ✓ and it reports its true type (✓˜2 = ✓)
is given by:
U2 (✓, ✓) =
h
pY
⇣
D
⇤⌘
+
 
1  p Y i   2 hpD⇤ +  1  p Y i , (15)
while S2’s utility when ✓2 = ✓ and it falsely reports ✓˜2 = ✓¯ is given by:
U2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
=
h
pY
⇣
D¯
⇤⌘
+
 
1  p Y i   2 hpD¯⇤ +  1  p Y i . (16)
The ✓-type has an incentive to mimic the ✓¯-type and borrow D¯
⇤
if:
U2 (✓, ✓) < U2
 
✓, ✓¯
 () Y ⇣D⇤⌘   2D⇤ < Y ⇣D¯⇤⌘   2D¯⇤ . (17)
The inequality in (17) holds because D
⇤
< D¯
⇤
< Dˆ2, where Dˆ2 = argmaxD2 [Y (D2)   2D2].
To sum up, if MU were to propose the pair
n
D
⇤
, D¯
⇤o
, the type ✓2 = ✓ finds it profitable to mimic the
type ✓¯.20
3.3 Fiscal Rules Under Asymmetric Information
MU ’s objective is to implement the most eﬃcient choice of D2 contingent on the asymmetric information
problem. We investigate the possibility to build a mechanism to discriminate between the two types of
country S2. MU puts in place a mechanism
 
(t2 (✓) , D2 (✓)) ,
 
t2
 
✓¯
 
, D2
 
✓¯
   
.21 Notice that, while D2 is
the quantity borrowed on the market at the beginning of the period, t2 is a sum to be paid to MU at the
19To rephrase it, the presence of (full) bail-out eradicates cross-subsidization between diﬀerent types of borrowers.
20It is straightforward to verify that type ✓2 = ✓¯ has no incentive to mimic the type ✓.
21The revelation principle applies. Hence, we focus on direct revelation mechanisms.
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end of the period, i.e., after the realization of output is observed by all the parties.
The lump-sum transfer t2 can be modeled as an (increase in the) interest rate paid by S2 when borrowing
money from the capital market. Intuitively, all else equal, because the ✓¯ type’s multiplier of public invest-
ments is higher than that of the ✓ type, the ✓¯ type may be willing than the ✓ type to borrow more at a
higher interest rate.
In the following we define t2 (✓) ⌘ t2, t2
 
✓¯
  ⌘ t¯2, D2 (✓) ⌘ D2, and D2  ✓¯  ⌘ D¯2. We first briefly discuss
S2’s Individual Rationality Constraint (IR✓), for ✓ 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. Suppose S2 rejects the mechanism proposed
by MU and over-borrows on the financial market. In this case, financial and political penalties are typically
imposed on S2. In the following, we assume that penalties are suﬃciently high to deter both types of S2
from over-borrowing.
We start our analysis with S2’s Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC ). The ✓ type’s constraint
(ICC✓) is given by:
⇥
pY (D2) +
 
1  p Y ⇤   2 ⇥p (YL,2 (D2) + t2) +  1  p min {YL,2 (D2) + t2, Y }⇤ > (18)
⇥
pY
 
D¯2
 
+
 
1  p Y ⇤   2 ⇥p  YL,2  D¯2 + t¯2 +  1  p min YL,2  D¯2 + t¯2, Y  ⇤ ,
while the ✓¯ type’s constraint (ICC✓) is given by:
⇥
p¯Y
 
D¯2
 
+ (1  p¯)Y ⇤   2 ⇥p¯  YL,2  D¯2 + t¯2 + (1  p¯)min YL,2  D¯2 + t¯2, Y  ⇤ > (19)
⇥
p¯Y (D2) +
 
1  p Y ⇤   2 [p¯ (YL,2 (D2) + t2) + (1  p¯)min {YL,2 (D2) + t2, Y }] .
We proceed by distinguishing diﬀerent cases depending on the value of the min-function within each
constraint.
Case 1: D2 > Y . Because eﬃciency requires D¯2 > D2, we also have D¯2 > Y . Given YL,2 (D2) = D2, for
D2 2
 
D2, D¯2
 
, we have min {YL,2 (D2) + t2 (D2) , Y } = Y , 8✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. We can then write (18) and (19) as:
t¯2   t2 > v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤ , (20)
t¯2   t2 < v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤ , (21)
respectively, where v2 = 1 2 .
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Because v2   1 and Y (D2)   D2, forD2 2  D2, D¯2 , the right-hand side (RHS) in (20) and (21) is positive.
From (20) and (21), it is easily shown that MU cannot discriminate between types as long as it wishes to
implement a pair of borrowing levels such that D¯2 > D2 > Y . Intuitively – when D¯ > D > Y – neither
type of borrowers is aﬀected by the transfers (t2 (D2)) when a bad state of nature realizes (with probability
1   p (✓2)). As a consequence, only the good state of nature matters, irrespectively of the borrower’s type.
The presence of only one relevant state of nature removes the relative diﬀerence between the two types of
borrower, that allows the discrimination between types in the first place. The irrelevance of one state of
nature makes the choice between the two proposed mechanisms independent of the borrower’s type.
Case 2: D2 < Y < D¯2. In this case, we can write the two constraints in (18) and (19) in the following way:
t¯2   t2 > v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤  1  pp [Y  min {D2 + t2, Y }] , (22)
t¯2   t2 < v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤  1  p¯p¯ [Y  min {D2 + t2, Y }] . (23)
Because p¯ > p, the RHS in (22) is lower than the RHS in (23), provided the last term in square brackets
in both RHSs is strictly greater than zero. The last condition holds if t2 is suﬃciently low and, in particular,
it holds if t2 = 0. If this is the case, MU can discriminate between the two types by appropriately designing
transfers {t2, t¯2}. Unlike in Case 1, both states of nature are relevant and allow for the exploitation of
✓¯ type’s comparative advantage – over ✓ type – in the expected realization of output.
Case 3: D2 < D¯2 < Y . In this case, the two constraints in (18) and (19) can be written as:
t¯2   t2 > v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤  1  pp ⇥min D¯2 + t¯2, Y   min {D2 + t2, Y }⇤ , (24)
t¯2   t2 < v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤  1  p¯p¯ ⇥min D¯2 + t¯2, Y   min {D2 + t2, Y }⇤ . (25)
As in Case 2, the RHS in (24) is lower than the RHS in (25) provided the last term in square brackets in
both RHSs is strictly greater than zero. This last condition holds if t2 is suﬃciently low and, in particular,
it holds if t2 = 0. Therefore, in this case also it is possible to design transfers {t2, t¯2} to separate the two
types of borrower.
We now discuss the otpimal choice of t2. As discussed in Case 2 and Case 3, an equilibrium that
discriminate between types requires a suﬃciently low value of t2.
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Lemma 1. MU optimally sets t
⇤
2 = 0.
Proof. Consider Case 2 and Case 3.22 From (4), the transfer t2 does not aﬀect MU ’s utility. Hence, MU ’s
objective is to design t2 so as to relax the borrower’s ICC.
Consider Case 2. We can write the combination of (22) and (23) in the following way:
X (t2) 
1  p
p
Z (t2) < t¯2 < X (t2) 
1  p¯
p¯
Z (t2) , (26)
where: 8><>:
X (t2) ⌘ t2 + v2
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   Y (D2)⇤  ⇥D¯2  D2⇤
Z (t2) ⌘ Y  min {D2 + t2, Y }
. (27)
From (26) and (27), both the left-hand side (LHS) and RHS are increasing in t2. Since @LHS@t2  
@RHS
@t2
, by
decreasing t2 MU (i) makes it possible to design a mechanism that discriminates between types of borrower
– i.e., it ensures that
⇣
X (t2)  1 pp Z (t2) , X (t2)  1 p¯p¯ Z (t2)
⌘
is not an empty set – and (ii) enlarges the values
of t¯2 such that a separating equilibrium exists. Hence, MU sets t
⇤
2 = 0. A very close reasoning establishes
that t
⇤
2 = 0 is also optimal in Case 3.
Having established the optimal value for t2, we can now turn to MU ’s choice of
 
D2, D¯2
 
. First, notice
that all the three cases above-analyzed rely on the following feasibility constraints:
t¯2 < Y
 
D¯2
   D¯2, (28)
t2 < Y (D2) D2, (29)
that ensure the feasibility of the transfer required by MU when a good state of nature realizes.
From (4), because transfers do not directly aﬀect MU ’s utility, it is easily seen that MU aims at imple-
menting borrowing levels which are as close as possible to the eﬃcient solution
 
D
⇤
2 (✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
.
Proposition 1. Provided  2 is suﬃciently high, MU implements the eﬃcient solution
 
D
⇤
2 (✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
if
D⇤2 (✓) < Y . If D
⇤
2 (✓)   Y instead, MU implements a second-best solution
 
DSB2 (✓) , D
SB
2
 
✓¯
  
, where
DSB2 (✓,  2) < Y < D
⇤
2 (✓) and DSB2
 
✓¯
 
= D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
.
22We disregard Case 1 because MU cannot discriminate between the two types of borrowers.
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Proof. Disregard first (28) and (29). Suppose MU implements some pair
 
D2 (✓) , D2
 
✓¯
  
. From (4), MU ’s
unconstrained choice is also equal to the first-best choice
 
D
⇤
2 (✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
as computed in (12). In the
presence of asymmetric information, MU can implement
 
D
⇤
2 (✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
provided D⇤2 (✓) < Y . In fact,
from the two pairs of inequalities (22)-(23) and (24)-(25) and from Lemma 1, there exists some t¯
⇤
2 > 0 such
that all the relevant Incentive Constraints hold.
Suppose D
⇤
2 (✓)   Y instead. In this case, from (20) and (21), the pair
 
D
⇤
2 (✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
does not allow
MU to discriminate between types of S2. MU then sets DSB2 (✓) = Y   " and DSB2
 
✓¯
 
= D
⇤  
✓¯
 
, for
" > 0 as small as one likes. The downward distortion to D2 (✓) allows MU to design an appropriate transfer 
tSB2 t¯
SB
2
 
, where tSB2 = 0 (from Lemma 1) and t¯SB2 verifies (22) and (23).
Finally, let us verify the inequalities in (28) and (29). The second inequality holds because t
⇤
2 = 0.
Concerning the first inequality in (28), from (22) it is easily seen that the implied lowerbound on t¯2 does not
exceed the upperbound implied by (28) as long as v2 takes a value suﬃciently close to 1, i.e., as long as  2 is
suﬃciently close to 1, and viceversa.
Finally, suppose that MU wishes to implement D2 = Y   " < D
⇤
2 (✓) and D¯2 = D
⇤  
✓¯
 
, for " > 0 as small
as one likes, but  2 is such that the feasibility constraint in (28) does not hold. In this case, whether MU
can implement a mechanism that discriminates among types of S2 while verifying all the relevant constraints
crucially depends on the value of p¯. From (25) and (28), the feasibility constraint holds if:
(v2   1)
⇥
Y
 
D¯2
   D¯2⇤  v2 [Y (D2) D2]  1  p¯p¯ [Y  D2] < 0. (30)
Because we are analyzing the case in which D2 < Y < D
⇤
(✓), we have that Y 0 (D2) > 1. Therefore,
whether the LHS in (30) is decreasing in D2 at D2 = Y   " depends on the value of p. Provided D2 = Y   "
does not verify the feasibility constraint in (28), for suﬃciently low values of p, MU can further distort
downward D2 to meet the feasibility constraint.
Intuitively, MU acts as a social planner and, as such, is interested in maximizing eﬃciency. MU inter-
nalizes the externalities created by potential bail-out among member states, and it design a mechanism to
correct the distorted incentives created by the presence of bail-out and asymmetric information overmember
states’ potential output. Transfers sole function is to achieve eﬃciency rather than extract surplus from
member countries. First, this logic explains why MU sets t⇤2 = 0. Second, it explains why MU introduces
‘no distortion at the top’ when D
⇤
(✓)   Y , i.e., when the first-best eﬃcient solution is not implementable
by resorting to transfers only. If D
⇤
(✓)   Y , in order to discriminate between types MU introduces the
smallest possible distortion in D2 (✓), for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. No distortion in D
⇤  
✓¯
 
is introduced because D2
 
✓¯
 
only aﬀects the transfers needed to sustain the equilibrium. A downward distortion to D2 (✓) is introduced
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so as to allow MU to exploit the relative diﬀerence in the types’ expected realization of output.
4 Conclusions
We oﬀer a simple framework capable of analyzing the economic and political determinants of fiscal budget
policies in countries that are part of a Monetary Union. Our framework highlights the important link between
(i) asymmetric information between the Union’s decision-making body and member states’ governments
about each member’s potential output – and, therefore, current output gap – and (ii) the issue of potential
bail-out among member states in case shocks asymmetrically hit diﬀerent economies. In an environment
characterized by asymmetric information and optimal counter-cyclical fiscal policies, the presence of bail-
out among member states, first, fosters member states to misreprent their current output gap – e.g., the
magnitude of the negative shock hitting their economy – so as to over-borrow on the financial market and,
second, lowers lenders’ (member states’) incentives to discriminate among borrowers’ (signal their) types.
Unlike member states, the Monetary Union internalizes the externalites and distortions created by the
interplay between bail-out and asymmetric information, and designs a mechanism to discriminate between
types of borrowers while preserving (possibly constrained) eﬃciency. We show that diﬀerent types of borrow-
ers – characterized by ‘high versus low’ output gaps – can be separated by means of an appropriate contract
linking a maximum level of borrowing on the financial market to an ex-post transfer to be made to the Union.
Intuitively, the Monetary Union discriminates ‘high-types’ (those characterized by a large (negative) output
gap) from ‘low-types’ (those characterized by a small output gap) by imposing on the former an additional
ex-post transfer (i.e., interest rate) to be paid when a good state of nature realizes. A downward distortion
in the maximum level of borrowing allowed for countries experiencing an economic expansion is introduced
when the eﬃcient level of borrowing is high relatively to the member state’s ability to repay in the presence
of a bad shock, e.g., when, all else equal, the member state’s level of outstanding debt is suﬃciently high. No
distortion is introduced on the level of borrowing of member states experiencing a recession. Finally, govern-
ments’ shortsightedness may hinder the functioning of the mechanism and, in the extreme, may prevent the
Monetary Union from discriminating among borrowers’ types.
The latest reforms to the European Monetary Union’s fiscal framework have introduced cyclically-adjusted
fiscal policies. While such reforms represent an attempt at implementing more eﬃcient counter-cyclical budget
deficits, they have generated several controversies between the Union’s decision making body and member
states’ national governments and, as shown in the recent ECB Economic Bulletin (European Central Bank
17
[2015]), have performed poorly in many countries. Arguably, such controversies greatly aﬀect the functioning
of these rules. To the extent to which controversies hinge on member states’ potential output (and output
gap), the mechanism proposed in this paper has the advantage of making member states – i.e., the most
informed parties – solely responsible for their budget defict choice (subject to constraints), that finally leads
to more eﬃcient budget deficits being eﬀectively implemented.
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